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Beholding Law: 
Amadeo on the Argentine Constitution 
 
Erin F. Delaney* and Christina D. Ponsa-Kraus** 
 
Not too long ago, a group of legal historians gathered to discuss the past and future of their 
discipline’s methodology.1 The conference, held at the UC Davis School of Law and attended by 
renowned senior scholars and a younger cadre of up-and-comers, invited participants to consider 
a methodological reorientation. The dominant “law and society” paradigm had defined the 
discipline for decades; what if instead of thinking in terms of “law and…,” scholars were to think 
instead in terms of “law as…”?2 This new formulation gave rise to an array of proposed 
conceptualizations of law for legal historians to consider: law as communication (the language of 
social relations); as consciousness (read: conscious resistance); as enchanted ritual (really—as in, 
magic); as sovereignty (always); and as economic and cultural activity (of course). 
 
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm and creativity generated by the provocative question, the 
conference did not produce “a manifesto for the next wave of sociolegal history.”3 Perhaps that 
was a good thing, or so at least one of the participants seemed to think.4 Let’s stop searching for 
the next big methodological turn, he suggested. True, we should be methodologically self-
conscious. But “[w]e cannot turn into the young and the restless, a James Dean (Rebel without a 
Scholarly Pause) sort of academic discipline always cruising down the road in search of the next 
big methodological approach.”5 
 
What a luxury, one cannot help thinking as one reads that sentence, to be able to stop 
worrying about methodology and just do what you love. But, of course, no academic discipline 
enjoys that luxury. It may be that a discipline can reach a certain kind of methodological 
maturity—a moment when its practitioners have earned a break from fretting about methodology 
just for a little while—but, for legal history, that moment may not yet have arrived. Will it ever? 
Every generation approaches the work of the previous with warranted skepticism about earlier 
historiographical practices. The reliability and sufficiency of sources and the persuasiveness of 
historical arguments are all revisited as scholars make novel finds, develop revisionist 
interpretations, and reflect on the past in light of cultural and technological change. 
                                                   
* Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. 
** George Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History and Walter E. Meyer Professor in Law & Social 
Problems, Columbia Law School.  For their research assistance, we would like to thank Brittany Adams 
and Tom Gaylord of the Northwestern Pritzker Legal Research Center and Heath R. Mayhew of the 
Arthur W. Diamond Law Library at Columbia Law School, as well as Kathryn Harvey and Stephen 
Matthew Schmidtt. 
1 ’Law As…’: Theory and Method in Legal History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (2011) (symposium issue). 
2 See Catherine Fisk & Robert Gordon, Foreword, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 519, 519–520 (2011). 
3 Id. at 527. 
4 Steven Wilf, Law/Text/Past, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 543 (2011). 
5 Id. at 563. 
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As with reading the past, reading comparative constitutional law introduces its own set of 
challenges, similarly affected by methodological flux. As Ran Hirschl has written, “since its birth, 
comparative constitutionalism has struggled with questions of identity.”6 Is it is a field? Does it 
have a distinct methodology? What are the normative implications of comparativism—are 
scholars searching for universal truths or contextualized cultural distinctions? Thus, to read and 
to use Argentine Constitutional Law today requires the same tools used in historiography: the 
excavation of the contextual background (including the strengths and weaknesses) of the 
comparative method at the time Santos Amadeo was writing, and some attempt at understanding 
the authorial choices and normative goals he might have brought to the project. While admittedly 
speculative, these insights should enrich our experience of Argentine Constitutional Law and allow 
current scholars to contend with both the highlights and the omissions in the book. 
 
Reading Amadeo in Context 
 
Amadeo’s graduate studies in the United States occurred during a time of renewed interest 
in comparative constitutional law. The 1920s saw increased scholarly productivity in the field,7 
and the subject returned to law school curricula in the 1930s.8 At Northwestern, where Amadeo 
received his J.D. degree, Dean Wigmore offered a course called the World’s Legal Systems,9 
derived from his three-volume compendium, A Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems, published 
in 1928. And at Columbia, where he earned his Ph.D. in law, Amadeo was able to enroll in a new 
comparative constitutional law seminar taught by Professors Francis Déak, Noel Dowling, and 
                                                   
6 RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (2014). 
7 See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW (1928); JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS (1928); Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of 
Comparative Law with a Critique of Sociological Jurisprudence, 35 HARV. L. REV. 838 (1922).  
8 See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW 328 (1955) (noting comparative constitutional 
law had for some time prior “fallen into low estate” at Columbia). The course had been offered at Columbia 
as early as 1877, when John W. Burgess had originally introduced it; his lecture notes for the year 1884-
1885, along with the class notes of two students who took the course the previous year, survive in 
manuscript form. See id. at 86 (describing Burgess’ proposal for a course titled “The Comparative Study of 
the Constitutional Law of the Present”); “Notes of Lectures on Comparative Constitutional Law [The 
United States, England, the German Empire, and France] delivered by Professor John W. Burgess A.M., 
Law School of Columbia College, 1884-1885,” Columbia Law School Archives, Arthur W. Diamond Law 
Library, Columbia University, New York; Herbert Livingston Satterlee, class notes taken at the School of 
Law, Columbia University, manuscript 1883-1884, Columbia Law School Archives, Arthur W. Diamond 
Law Library, Columbia University, New York; John Armstrong Chaloner, class notes taken at the School 
of Law, Columbia University, manuscript 1883-1884, Columbia Law School Archives, Arthur W. Diamond 
Law Library, Columbia University, New York.  
9 This class was offered during the 1934-1935 academic year, when Santos Amadeo was enrolled at 
Northwestern. See NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY BULLETIN, 1934-1935, at 26; NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 
BULLETIN, 1935-1936, at 46. Class lists are unavailable, so it is unknown whether Amadeo took the class. 
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Lindsey Rogers.10 This latter experience would be critical to his development and interests in 
comparativism. 
 
Amadeo arrived at Columbia Law School at a transformative moment in the history of 
American legal scholarship and education. “Ferment is abroad in the law” was how Karl 
Llewellyn memorably put it as he debated Roscoe Pound over legal realism in the pages of the 
Harvard Law Review.11 Writing just a few years earlier, Columbia’s Dean Smith had argued, in a 
legal realist vein, that “the university law school cannot remain content with merely schooling 
students in legal doctrine and lawyer’s technique…. If the law is to be made more useful in the 
regulation of human affairs, the lawyers and judges of the future must also acquire an 
understanding of legal phenomena, an appreciation of the social implications of rules of law, and 
a knowledge of their actual effects, which cannot be obtained from the literature of the law 
alone.”12 
 
This aspiration is discernible, if not explicit, in Edwin W. Patterson’s Foreword to the materials 
for Déak, Dowling, and Rogers’ comparative constitutional law seminar.13 Describing 
comparative constitutional law as both “a method of the political scientist and of the practical 
statesman” and “an aid to philosophical speculation”—qualities reflecting the mission of the 
“university law school”—Patterson observed that “modern science” had transformed 
comparative law. Whereas earlier generations had believed “that the purely adventitious or 
nationalistic features of particular legal systems could be stripped from the indispensable nuclei 
of basic legal principles and concepts,” these “ambitious hopes for comparative law can hardly 
                                                   
10 The professors teaching Amedeo’s comparative constitutional law seminar were leading academic 
figures of the time: Professor Dowling was the Nash Professor of Law, focused on U.S. constitutional law, 
see William T. Gossett, The Human Side of Chief Justice Hughes, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1973, at 1415. Professor Rogers, 
the Burgess Professor of Public Law, co-authored The New Constitutions of Europe in 1922, a volume that 
provided English translations of post-WWI European constitutions and was widely praised for its attention 
to detail, see William M. Freeman, Lindsay Rogers, Law Professor at Columbia, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1970, 
at 30). See also Arnold Bennett Hall, The New Constitutions of Europe, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 508 (1923) (book 
review); James Hart, The New Constitutions of Europe, 32 YALE L. J. 635, 636 (1923) (book review); T.J. Michie, 
Jr., The New Constitutions of Europe, 9 VA. L. REV. 405, 405–06 (1923) (book review); Herbert F. Wright, The 
New Constitutions of Europe, 17 AM. J. INT’L L. 595, 597 (1923) (book review). And Professor Déak, educated 
at the University of Budapest and at Harvard, was an international law scholar of some renown, having 
taught in Geneva, Paris, and the Hague, see Francis Deak, 72, Professor of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1972, at 59. 
11 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). 
See also Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).  
12 COLUMBIA LAW REPORTS (1929), at 99. 
13 As noted above, of the three professors who taught the seminar, only Déak was involved in preparing 
materials. See Francis Déak and A. Arthur Schiller, Introductory Readings and Materials to the Study of 
Comparative Law, Columbia Law School Archives, Arthur W. Diamond Law Library, Columbia University, 
New York. Note that Amadeo thanks both Déak and Dowling in the preface to Argentine Constitutional Law. 
SANTOS AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1943) (ix). 
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be indulged today,” he wrote.14 “Comparative law is not… a law of gravity for all legal systems. 
It is a method of study, a discipline, but it has no irreducible elements save those uncertain limits 
to the pliability of human nature.” Turning to the objectives served by the study of comparative 
law, Patterson argued that it would be of value to practicing lawyers with matters involving 
foreign law, idealists working on international peace, and jurists and legal scholars hoping to 
improve American law, before adding a note on the more “philosophical” aims of comparative 
study: “After all, a sufficient justification for any university study is its capacity to satisfy man’s 
mature intellectual curiosity. In addition to the worthy claims of professional training and 
contemporary public service, the university may well seek to satisfy the timeless claim of the 
philosopher.” And by preparing materials that promised to serve all of these goals, he concluded, 
Déak and Schiller had “made comparative law a university discipline.” 
 
It was, of course, one thing to articulate the aspirations of a “university discipline” and 
another to achieve them.15  Comparativists at the time struggled to identify a methodology and a 
governing purpose to the field. The observation or description of foreign law, as well as of 
international law, were both subsumed in the broader “comparative law” construct.16 Wigmore 
suggested three approaches to its study: nomoscopy, or the aim of thick factual description; 
nomothetics, or the normative evaluation of different systems; and nomogenetics, the effort to trace 
“the evolution of various systems in their relation one to another in chronology and causes” (a 
description that resonates with today’s focus on constitutional borrowing).17 Once venturing 
beyond the purely descriptive, however, scholars failed to clearly define normative goals and to 
recognize their Eurocentric preconceptions. Max Rheinstein, a professor of Comparative Law at 
the University of Chicago, argued in 1938 that the field’s core inquiry should be one of 
determining the “sociology of law,” or the “social function of law,” but he concluded that it was 
“so little developed” that it was hardly teachable. He argued for the “‘functional comparison of 
                                                   
14 These and the remaining quotations in this paragraph all appear in Patterson’s Foreword to the class 
materials. See Edwin Patterson, Foreword, in Déak and Schiller, Introductory Readings, supra note 13, at iv. 
15 An analogous difficulty has been captured nicely by Robert Gordon in the context of the discipline of 
legal history, which experienced its own “ferment” in the 1930s. Articulating a distinction between 
“internal” legal history, which relies mainly on “distinctively legal sources”—particularly opinions written 
by judges—and “external” history, which looks to a broader range of materials encompassing sources not 
traditionally thought of as properly “legal,” Gordon explains that, “though a conviction of the importance 
of the influence of social surroundings on law was what drove historians of this time to research in local 
sources…, it did not carry most of them to write external legal history.” Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: J. 
Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & HIST. REV. 9, 26 
(1975). Willard Hurst, the subject of his article and the symposium it introduces, pioneered the writing of 
what Gordon calls “external” legal history, beginning in the 1930s. Id. at 11. Gordon then assesses various 
explanations before settling on his own suggestion: The failure of the period to produce an “extensive 
external historiography of law,” he speculates, could be explained by historians’ desire—an “anxious 
solicitude,” Gordon puts it—to preserve the common law. Id. at 29 
16 See Walther Hug, The History of Comparative Law, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (1932); Max Rheinstein, 
Teaching Comparative Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 615, at 616–17.  
17 As described by Hug, supra note 16, at 1027, n.2 (citing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE 
WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS (1928), at 1115). 
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legal rules and institutions’,” as the only appropriate area for instruction, to be used to shed light 
on the “clarification and understanding of the rules and institutions of American law.”18 
 
The materials for Columbia Law School’s comparative constitutional law seminar in the 1930s 
are not explicit in their methodological approach, but the content exhibits a functional focus on 
courts and the common law/civil code divide,19 and includes work by a number of American 
theorists outlining American practices. We might imagine the conversations in class taking the 
form that Rheinstein advocated. The highlighted comparators are largely European-based, 
including the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. Nevertheless, and 
notwithstanding the Eurocentric focus of the materials, the course assignments had a wider 
scope, as Amadeo was “assigned a topic on the Supreme Court of Argentina and its constitutional 
jurisprudence.”20 In his paper, Amadeo’s primary focus—the judicial function in the maintenance 
of the federal system—reflected the interests of his main advisor, Professor Dowling, known for 
his study of the constitutional problems of federalism.21 But the book that developed out of this 
paper would ultimately expand to cover individual rights in detail, with extensive evaluation of 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Argentina. 
  
Argentine Constitutional Law is avowedly comparative: Amadeo explains in his preface that 
“since the constitutional law of the United States has had a profound influence on the 
development of constitutional law in Argentina, emphasis has been placed upon the relationship, 
the similarities and the differences, between the two.”22 Amadeo’s hope was for his book to 
“provoke interest in the study of Argentine constitutional law on the part of students and 
commentators on the constitutional law of the United States,” leading to “further studies of a 
                                                   
18 Rheinstein, supra note 16, at 618–19, 622–23.  
19 This focus is unsurprising for an American course at the time. See David S. Clark, Nothing New in 2000? 
Comparative Law in 1900 and Today, 75 TUL. L REV. 871, 888–92 (2001) (noting that the 1904 St Louis Congress 
of Comparative Law highlighted the role of courts and judicial power, in comparison to the 1900 Paris 
Congress which focused on “legislation—and the scholarly flavor of its legal culture”). 
20 Noel T. Dowling, Doctrina: Paralelos Constitucionales Entre La Argentina y Los Estados Unidos, 22 REVISTA 
ARGENTINA JURÍDICA (EDITORIAL LAW LEY) 1, 2 (1941) (translation by Ponsa-Kraus).  
21 Dowling also had a reputation for his “lawyerly” approach to teaching constitutional law. GOEBEL, supra 
note 8, at 270. 
22 AMADEO, supra note 13, at ix.  
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more specialized nature.”23 Although this aspiration has been realized in the twenty-first 
century,24 his book stood alone among works in English for much of the twentieth century.25 
 
The book’s opening discussion of the history of constitutional development in Argentina is 
nuanced, as is its attention to context and history. Perhaps Amadeo’s “eight months in Buenos 
Aires studying the Argentine system on its territory” provided perspective.26 He takes care to 
observe that although Argentinian federalism may have been influenced by external experiences, 
“the factors which gave rise to the idea and the necessity… had their deep roots in the political, 
economic, and social history of the nation, as well as in its geographical features, and in the 
characteristics of the Argentine people.”27 
 
Notwithstanding these important gestures to context and the willingness to engage with 
alternative influences on Argentinian constitutional development,28 Amadeo’s drive to find 
functional comparisons with the United States may have led him to prioritize perceived 
similarities between the two systems, with less critical attention to divergences. He does highlight 
one important difference: the enhanced role of the Argentine federal government in ensuring a 
“republican form of government” in the provinces. Although both constitutions share a 
“Republican Guarantee Clause,” the Argentine constitution further guarantees to each province 
“the enjoyment and exercise of its own institutions.”29 This additional constitutional protection 
was used to justify federal intervention in provincial affairs for activities ranging from corruption 
of elections, to “usurpation of public offices after elector defeat,” to “the enactment of laws in 
violation of the Constitution.”30 But in his brief analysis of these provisions, this “fundamental 
difference between the practice of federalism in Argentina and in the United States” is chalked 
                                                   
23 Id. at x.  
24 See, e.g., REBECCA BILL CHAVEZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES: JUDICIAL POLITICS IN 
ARGENTINA (2004); GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS 
IN ARGENTINA (2005); Robert S. Barker, Background Notes and Constitutional Provisions Concerning Argentine 
Federalism, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 539 (2004) (discussing the constitutional history of Argentina and the legal 
development of its Constitution); Lucas S. Grossman, Argentine Constitutional Law. An Overview, 43 INT’L J. 
LEGAL INFO. 1 (2015) (discussing the Argentinian constitutional reforms and problems with the 
Constitution over time); Abelardo Levaggi, Three Matters Concerning Argentine Constitutional History, 16 
RECHTSGESCHICHTE-LEGAL HISTORY 82 (2010) (summarizing three distinct periods in Argentine 
constitutionalism).  
25 Sidney B. Jacoby, Argentine Constitutional Law, 12 U. CHI. L. REV. 304, 304 (1945) (book review) (describing 
Amadeo’s book as the “first textbook in English on Argentine constitutional law”). In the wake of the 1994 
constitutional amendments, there was renewed interest in Argentine constitutionalism, see, e.g., Janet 
Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L. L. 281 (1999). 
26 Dowling, supra note 20, at 2. 
27 AMADEO, supra note 13, at 7.  
28 Id. at 32 (referencing the Chilean Constitution of 1833, the Swiss Constitution of 1848, the German 
Confederation and the French Constitution of 1791).  
29 Const. Arg. arts. 5, 6 (1853). 
30 AMADEO, supra note 13, at 93.  
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up to the compromises made in the Argentine Constitution between federal and unitary 
principles. Amadeo takes the U.S. approach, leaving “the people of the states to solve their own 
political problems,” as the more appropriate baseline for a federal system.31  But scholars today 
question that assumption, recognizing the enormous dangers of “subnational 
authoritarianism.”32 A modern scholar might instead suggest that the U.S. approach gave states 
flexibility to structure their internal political systems in ways that disenfranchised and terrorized 
state citizens.33 
 
Nevertheless, Amadeo is right to observe that the drafters of the Argentine Constitution were 
heavily influenced by the United States Constitution. Indeed, the text itself reveals it, as do the 
statements of contemporary Argentine statesmen and intellectuals whom Amadeo discusses.34 
His stated purpose is to highlight the links with the United States, and the book goes on to make 
many comparisons between Argentine and U.S. federalism, including detailed discussions of 
Argentine Supreme Court cases citing to Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States and to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. His success in meeting this goal is 
reflected by Argentina’s inclusion in George Billias’s American Constitutionalism Heard Round the 
World, 1776-1989.35 In that book, Amadeo is referenced as a “learned Argentine scholar”; did 
Billias mean a learned scholar of Argentina? Or a scholar from Argentina? For it is Amadeo’s 
identity as a Puerto Rican that further complicates the question of his choices as a comparativist. 
 
Reading Amadeo as Amadeo  
 
Like the United States Constitution, the Argentine Constitution provided for the existence of 
territories (non-state “U.S. territories” in the United States; non-provincial “national territories” 
in Argentina).  But this comparison just barely makes it into the book, though one strongly 
suspects that this relative inattention is not due to lack of knowledge or curiosity on Amadeo’s 
part. Amadeo does not address the territories as a stand-alone matter in the book but alludes to 
a marked distinction between the two systems in passing, in a discussion about the creation of 
legislative courts. In addressing whether the territorial courts in the federal capital were 
constitutional or legislative (and thus whether their jurisdiction could be altered by Congress), 
                                                   
31 Id. at 95. 
32 See Edward Gibson, Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries, 58 WORLD POL. 
101 (2005) (discussing Oaxaca in Mexico and Santiago del Estero in Argentina).  
33 See ROBERT MICKEY, PATHS OUT OF DIXIE: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AUTHORITARIAN ENCLAVES IN 
AMERICA’S DEEP SOUTH, 1944-1972 (2015). 
34 AMADEO, supra note 13, at 29–34. These included, of course, Juan Bautista Alberdi, known as the father of 
the Argentine Constitution.  Amadeo addresses Alberdi’s contributions in detail, and the central role 
played by his book, Bases and Points of Departure for the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic, in 
which Alberdi recommended using the United States as a model for a federal system.  Id. at 30–31. 
35 GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ‘ROUND THE WORLD, 1776-1989: A 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 135 (2009). Note that the influence of the American constitution has since declined. See 
generally David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
762 (2012). 
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the Argentine Supreme Court cited Story favorably for the claim that, in the United States, 
territorial courts are legislative courts, “‘created in virtue of the general sovereignty which exists 
in the national government over its territories.’”36 Amadeo noted that Argentine writers had 
criticized this decision, because “the principle expounded by Story that the territories of the 
United States do not form a part of the nation is not applicable in Argentina in as much as under 
the preamble of the Argentine Constitution the territories are a part of the Republic.”37 But he 
delves no further into the distinction or the role of U.S. influence in this area.38 
 
Amadeo’s seminar paper, however, handles the territories differently. Although the 
discussion here is brief as well, it begins with a pointed declaration of the importance of the 
subject of such territories for an understanding of a federalist system. “As the knowledge of the 
political geography of a country, [e]specially like that of a federal state like Argentin[a], is 
essential[]in order to understand the organization of the federal system… it is necessary to discuss 
briefly the political subdivisions created by the constitution and which exercise governmental 
powers within the limits of the Argentine territory.”39 The paper goes on to describe the four 
kinds of political subdivisions provided for by the Argentine constitution: provinces (fourteen at 
the time; by now twenty-three), the federal capital, the national territories (eleven at the time), 
and the central national government.40 It then identifies two constitutional provisions specifically 
addressing the territories: One confers exclusive legislative power upon the Argentine Congress 
over the national capital and any territory annexed by purchase or cession to establish “forts, 
arsenals, magazines, or other useful establishment[s] of national utility”; the other empowers the 
Argentine Congress to establish governments in the national territories and to create new 
provinces. Finally, it summarizes the 1884 law that established these governments and set forth 
eligibility criteria for their admission into provincial status.41 
 
                                                   
36 AMADEO, supra note 13, at 60, n.19 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 445 (5th ed. 1891)). 
37 Id. at 60–61. Our own reading of the Preamble does not support this interpretation; indeed, it describes 
the Argentine Confederation as composed of the provinces, though at the time, Argentina’s territory 
consisted of both provinces and national territories. That said, the Preamble does promise the blessings of 
liberty to all people of the world who wish to live on Argentine “territory,” without limiting this promise 
to inhabitants of the provinces alone; perhaps that is the language Amadeo had in mind. Const. Arg. 
Preamble (1853). 
38 According to Amadeo, one Argentine writer, Dr. Felipe A. Espil, denied the relevance of Story’s analysis 
because it derived from a case involving a Congressionally created court in Florida, not one in the District 
of Columbia. Id. That distinction was not salient at the time of the Argentine case (1886), but Amadeo 
includes a brief footnote where he says that this distinction between territories and the federal district 
(Washington D.C.) (hypothesized by Espil) was made by the U.S. Supreme Court in O’Donoghue v. United 
States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933). AMADEO, supra note 13, at 61 n.20.  
39 Santos P. Amadeo, “The Argentine Constitutional System,” Seminar in Comparative Constitutional Law, 
Professors Dowling, Déak, and Rogers, Columbia University Law School, May 25, 1938, at 2–3. 
40 Id. at 3. 
41 Id. at 7–8; see Const. Arg. art. 64, cls. 14, 27 (1853) (Amadeo’s paper mistakenly identifies these provisions 
as Art. 67, cl. 14 and 27). 
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While concise, to be sure, these seminar pages lay down a marker for the proposition that 
there is more to Argentine federalism than the dual sovereignty of national and provincial 
governments, and that thorough comprehension of any federalist system requires the study of all 
varieties of jurisdiction. The book settles on a mere passing reference to the territories, leaving the 
reader with little more than a glimpse of what else might exist beyond the national and provincial 
governments, and without an assessment of its importance. 
 
Moreover, neither the book nor the paper alludes to the influence of U.S. constitutionalism on 
this particular aspect of Argentine constitutionalism. There is no mention of the Territory Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution and no discussion of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the territories 
of the United States, whether before or after the annexation of Puerto Rico. None of this would 
feel quite so significant were the author not a Puerto Rican scholar. But he is, and so his relative 
silence on the subject of the territories is difficult for us to ignore; and, in light of his own 
observations concerning its importance in the original seminar paper, positively intriguing. 
 
What precisely to make of this relative silence is a harder question, and not one we try to 
answer definitively here. Instead, we indulge in a bit of speculation. Maybe his editors at 
Columbia University Press thought the territories should await separate treatment. Maybe 
Amadeo, who among his many accomplishments would go on to publish numerous books, teach 
at the University of Puerto Rico law school, litigate a number of prominent cases as defense 
attorney for high-profile clients, and serve as counsel to the Puerto Rico branch of the ACLU, 
simply got too busy to develop the book in this direction. Maybe it is an instance of those “limits 
to the pliability of human nature” to which Patterson referred in his Foreword to the seminar 
materials. Maybe all of these are really the same thing. 
 
Maybe, though, there is something more openly, if tacitly, normative in it. Maybe—this is just 
a guess, but maybe—Amadeo chose to take note of the full array of jurisdictions in Argentine 
federalism without then undertaking a full exploration of them himself because it was the 
provinces, in his view, that embodied what Argentine federalism should be, whereas the 
territories represented unfulfilled aspiration: exceptional, subordinate, and transitional. Maybe. 
 
A similar mystery arises with the respect to the seminar materials, which in their own way 
remind us of the uncertain place of territories in a federalist system. As noted above, the materials 
adopted a Eurocentric perspective. Yet they concluded, improbably and without explanation, 
with an edited version of a 1920 decision by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which were 
then, of course, a territory of the United States. The issue in the case, In re Shoop (1920), was on 
what grounds Max Shoop, a member of the Bar of the State of New York, could be admitted to 
the Bar of the Philippines.42 The Supreme Court of the Philippines allowed admission based on 
comity: If New York State admitted lawyers from the Philippines to practice in New York, then 
the Court would allow New York lawyers to practice in the Philippines. 
 
                                                   
42 In re Shoop, 41 PHIL. REP. 213 (S.C. 1920).    
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In the unedited version of the case, the Supreme Court of the Philippines focuses first on the 
first prong of the New York State rule of admission, which included any person “admitted to 
practice and who has practiced five years as a member of the bar in the highest law court in any 
other state or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia.”43 The question for 
the Supreme Court of the Philippines to answer, therefore, was whether the Philippines are a 
“territory.” It concludes the Philippines must be a territory: “Otherwise, the Philippines would 
be in an anomalous position like unto Edward Everett Hale’s ‘A Man Without a Country’—a land 
neither ‘another country,’ nor a ‘state,’ nor a ‘territory’—a land without status.”44 The Court then 
decides that since the Philippines are covered by the first category under the New York law, there 
exists between the Philippines and New York “a basis of comity” sufficient for Shoop’s admission. 
 
The Court goes on, however, to examine an alternative ground: the second prong of the New 
York State rule, which allowed the admission of “any person admitted to practice and who has 
practiced five years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the 
English Common Law.”45 If the Philippine Islands are not a “state or territory,” then they must 
be “another country,” and in that case, “[t]he question then presented is upon what principles is 
the present jurisprudence of these Islands based?” The Court embarks on a discussion, first, of 
what is meant by the “English common law,” and then, of whether the jurisprudence of the 
Philippines is based on the principles of the English common law. Many pages later, the Court 
arrives at an affirmative answer, and a second basis of comity.46 
 
The editors of the course materials, however, chose to highlight only the second prong of the 
New York rule, covering lawyers from “another country,” and the Court’s discussion of it. Absent 
from the entire discussion is whether the Philippines are a “territory.” Instead, the edited version 
picks up just before the discussion of whether the Philippines have a jurisprudence based on the 
English common law. Thus do the Philippines become, with the stroke of a pen, “another 
country.” Both at the time of the 1920 case and when Amadeo took the subsequent seminar, the 
Philippines were a territory of the United States, subject entirely to U.S. sovereignty, and years 
away from gaining independence. 
 
Any professor who has prepared materials for a law school course knows the challenges of 
editing cases. Asking students to read every page of every judicial opinion assigned would be a 
crushing demand, and so one tailors the cases toward the pedagogical ends of the course. But we 
have to wonder what precisely motivated the choice made here. The edited version of In re Shoop 
in these seminar materials omitted entirely the references to the Philippines as a territory, and left 
in place passages implying that the Philippines were a foreign country. (Of course, New York 
isn’t a sovereign country either, nor was it “foreign” to the Philippines. But it appears to stand in 
here for the “common law.” And at any rate, its status remains clear post-edits.) 
 
                                                   
43 Id. at 215. 
44 Id. at 218. 
45 Id. at 218. 
46 Id. at 256–57.  
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Might the deletion of references to the Philippines’ status as a territory in the edited version 
of In re Shoop suggest something about the relationship between empire and comparative law—
along with something about the seminar professors’ views about that relationship? Did they find 
it uncomfortable? Or just befuddling? Whatever their understanding, their editorial choice seems 
to suggest that a colony is somehow not a proper subject of comparison; hence the erasure of the 
Philippines’ colonial status for purposes of its role as an example in a comparative law course. 
The Philippines were then still part of U.S. sovereign territory; they were contained within the 
United States’ internationally recognized boundaries. Perhaps the professors allowed themselves 
this sleight of hand because the United States had by then made clear that the Philippines would 
someday be independent.47 Or perhaps, they knew little or nothing about the Philippines and 
their relation to the United States, in which case they were like most Americans in this respect. 
 
But Amadeo was not. When he read the edited version of In re Shoop, he must have been 
struck by these erasures. Did he say anything about it to his professors? Did he try to find the 
unedited case? Did he question whether assuming that the Philippines were a foreign country 
was somehow essential to a comparative approach? We don’t know. What we do know is that he 
believed that it is necessary to understand every variety of jurisdiction encompassed within a 
federal system in order to understand that system. We know that despite having made this view 
clear in his seminar paper, his book ultimately did not explore the topic of Argentina’s national 
territories. And we know that, as a Puerto Rican, Amadeo knew exactly what he was doing when 
he made that choice. 
 
Conclusion: Inclusions, Omissions, and Comparisons 
 
As we turn to the past to revisit Amadeo’s work, we find ourselves beholding Amadeo 
beholding law. Using the tools of historiography, we have sought to excavate the context and 
normative goals of an author, with a view toward a critical and engaged reading of his work. 
Amadeo wrote Argentine Constitutional Law when the modern field of comparative constitutional 
law was in its nascent state, at a time of methodological uncertainty for the discipline. Viewing 
his book over 75 years later, we are confronted with challenges that every scholarly generation 
faces: What is included and what is omitted? How can a reader, external to the experience of the 
one or more countries, evaluate the comparisons made? What do these comparisons reveal? 
Reflecting the practices and preoccupations of its time, to be sure, Amadeo’s book offers an 
erudite and rigorous analysis of the jurisprudence of the Argentine Supreme Court, enriched by 
a historical introduction attuned to the importance of context for an understanding of law even 
as it serves primarily to set the stage for a doctrinally focused work. The book pioneered the 
comparative study of Argentine constitutional law for English-speaking scholars, and it stands to 
this day as essential reading on the subject. May it continue to serve as a gateway to further 
exploration of federalism, rights, judicial power, and constitutionalism around the globe. 
                                                   
47 Several years earlier, Congress had passed legislation providing for a process leading to Philippine 
independence. See An act to provide for the complete independence of the Philippine Islands, to provide for the 
adoption of a constitution and a form of government for the Philippine islands, and for other purposes, 48 Stat. 456 
(March 24, 1934). 
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